The geospatial product trap

Too often we fall in love with the technology, not the problem.

<This post is a repeat from one I authored on the Sparkgeo blog>

I am a lucky person. My job has evolved to one where I primarily talk about geospatial technology all day. I could be scoping out internal or external projects or evaluating technologies. Increasingly, I provide advice on product ideas. This final situation has forced me to consider the nature of our community of practice. The common assumption that geospatial is somehow an independent industry is a bait for the geospatial trap.

Geospatial is a deeply horizontal activity. I can get on board with the notion that GIS is a separate vertical. The colours and noise of GIS obscure a much bigger geospatial horizontal (in many ways, this reminds me of the fallacy of obviousness, but I digress.) Geospatial activities are embedded deeply in so many verticals that we find ourselves beset with brainstorming sessions to determine new and alluring “use cases.” Indeed, companies like Sparkgeo need only an exciting idea, and we can chase it down; that is the nature of a boutique service business. But products are different, demanding more strategic focus and the nature of geospatial is a trap for the unwary: there are too many shiny objects.

Let me describe a scenario:

An entrepreneur or technologist finds me on Twitter or LinkedIn. They are very excited to hear my opinion on their product. I am probably too open with my advice, so I agree to listen.

I listen.

Their technology sounds terrific. I then ask what problem their technology solves, and they reply that customers could use it to study ports or agriculture. I repeat my question, and they suggest finance or defence would be possible markets.

This entrepreneur has fallen into the geospatial product trap.

Don’t think that this trap is the sole territory of small startups or new technology. Some substantial and established companies are deeply and firmly trapped. I can think of three off the top of my head. Companies big enough to think they should own every vertical where their product might be useful, big enough to know better and old enough to have learned this lesson.

Mature enough that they should have been able to calculate the opportunity cost of their myopia.

The trap is real, and the trap is multi-faceted.

1) The fact is the product in question might actually be relevant to multiple markets. That’s the bait.

If you start to think of your product as a horizontal, you need to know a lot about a lot. It is expensive and corporately complicated for a company to know that much.

Your sales team needs to empathize with the intricate details of every vertical you want to address. This multiplies business development and sales costs by as many verticals as you want to address. Additionally, without question, each of those verticals will need a slightly different product. Yes, you have multiplied your product development costs as well. Finally, achieving a real sense of corporate alignment is hard if you continue to chase the next shiny object.

Are you a space company? Then what are you doing in Ag? Why are you also in logistics? And you have a forestry business? Weird. Do you even know what you do?

2) A company falling in love with the problem is closer to its customers.

Loving the problem is critical because your technology will age and become obsolete. If you love the problem, you will happily change how you solve that problem to do it better. If you love the technology, you will care more about your method than the result, putting you out of alignment with your customers.

Whatever serendipitous commercial tryst you shared could fall apart with a change in the business environment. Think about Netflix falling in love with providing content to people, switching from DVDs to streaming. With its commitment to iconic real-estate and physical media, Blockbuster missed that the customer’s problem was being solved better by others. Blockbuster committed to how, not what.

3) But the markets ARE there. Why leave money on the table? Why leave space for a competitor?

We are circling the trap here.

It is, oh, so tempting.

A strategy is more about saying no than yes. It is easy to say yes in business; it is much harder to say no. But if you insist on being horizontally oriented, the best way to grow is through deeply aligned, opinionated partnerships. You should still own a problem because feeling a customer’s pain helps sculpt your product and ensures alignment. But for the other verticals, find partners who have domain expertise and invest in them.

The question of partners is crucial for data companies. Providers of data are most at risk from the geospatial product trap.

I cannot tell you how many discussions I have had with companies about use cases for their new sensor. The company focuses entirely on the sensor and the fact that no other sensors are like it in space. Not the problem it is supposed to solve because the company has no idea what problems it can solve! The problem is an excuse for them to seek funding or blast a proof of concept into the sky. Technology can be transformational, but not in and of itself. The transformation is a business process, a problem.

If you want to focus on the technology, you must find partners, and you better hope they don’t discover a streaming alternative to your DVD. In the meantime, take a look around and see how many new and old companies you can spot that have fallen for the geospatial product trap.